

EXHIBIT A

NOTICE TO DEFENDANT:

(AVISO AL DEMANDADO):

CRESCENT ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY, a corporation; and
DOES 1 through 25, inclusive

FOR COURT USE ONLY (SOLO PARA USO DE LA CORTE)
FILED
NORTH COUNTY DIVISION
2008 JAN -4 PM 4:17
(1) CLERK-SUPERIOR COURT SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CA

YOU ARE BEING SUED BY PLAINTIFF:

(LO ESTÁ DEMANDANDO EL DEMANDANTE):

ELIZABETH MONTIEL, an individual

You have 30 CALENDAR DAYS after this summons and legal papers are served on you to file a written response at this court and have a copy served on the plaintiff. A letter or phone call will not protect you. Your written response must be in proper legal form if you want the court to hear your case. There may be a court form that you can use for your response. You can find these court forms and more information at the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), your county law library, or the courthouse nearest you. If you cannot pay the filing fee, ask the court clerk for a fee waiver form. If you do not file your response on time, you may lose the case by default, and your wages, money, and property may be taken without further warning from the court.

There are other legal requirements. You may want to call an attorney right away. If you do not know an attorney, you may want to call an attorney referral service. If you cannot afford an attorney, you may be eligible for free legal services from a nonprofit legal services program. You can locate these nonprofit groups at the California Legal Services Web site (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), the California Courts Online Self-Help Center (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp), or by contacting your local court or county bar association.

Tiene 30 DÍAS DE CALENDARIO después de que le entreguen esta citación y papeles legales para presentar una respuesta por escrito en esta corte y hacer que se entregue una copia al demandante. Una carta o una llamada telefónica no lo protegen. Su respuesta por escrito tiene que estar en formato legal correcto si desea que procesen su caso en la corte. Es posible que haya un formulario que usted pueda usar para su respuesta. Puede encontrar estos formularios de la corte y más información en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp/espanol/), en la biblioteca de leyes de su condado o en la corte que le quede más cerca. Si no puede pagar la cuota de presentación, pida al secretario de la corte que le dé un formulario de exención de pago de cuotas. Si no presenta su respuesta a tiempo, puede perder el caso por incumplimiento y la corte le podrá quitar su sueldo, dinero y bienes sin más advertencia.

Hay otros requisitos legales. Es recomendable que llame a un abogado inmediatamente. Si no conoce a un abogado, puede llamar a un servicio de remisión a abogados. Si no puede pagar a un abogado, es posible que cumpla con los requisitos para obtener servicios legales gratuitos de un programa de servicios legales sin fines de lucro. Puede encontrar estos grupos sin fines de lucro en el sitio web de California Legal Services, (www.lawhelpcalifornia.org), en el Centro de Ayuda de las Cortes de California, (www.courtinfo.ca.gov/selfhelp/espanol) o poniéndose en contacto con la corte o el colegio de abogados locales.

The name and address of the court is:

(El nombre y dirección de la corte es):

North County Superior Court
325 S. Melrose Dr.
Vista, CA 92083

CASE NUMBER:
(Número del Caso) 37-2008-00088094-CU-OE-NC

North County Vista Regional Center

The name, address, and telephone number of plaintiff's attorney, or plaintiff without an attorney, is:

(El nombre, la dirección y el número de teléfono del abogado del demandante, o del demandante que no tiene abogado, es):

Joseph P. Zampi, Esq. #110168 (619) 231-9920 (619) 231-8529

Gerald B. Determan, Esq. #134905; Christopher B. DeSaulniers, Esq. #213934

Law Firm of Zampi and Associates

225 Broadway, Suite 1450, San Diego, CA 92101

DATE: JAN - 4 2008 Clerk, by P. GOMEZ, Deputy
(Fecha) (Secretario) (Adjunto)

(For proof of service of this summons, use Proof of Service of Summons (form POS-010).)

(Para prueba de entrega de esta citación use el formulario Proof of Service of Summons, (POS-010)).

NOTICE TO THE PERSON SERVED: You are served

[SEAL]

- as an individual defendant.
- as the person sued under the fictitious name of (specify):

- on behalf of (specify): a corporation

under: CCP 416.10 (corporation) CCP 416.60 (minor)
 CCP 416.20 (defunct corporation) CCP 416.70 (conservatee)
 CCP 416.40 (association or partnership) CCP 416.90 (authorized person)
 other (specify):

- by personal delivery on (date):

JOSEPH P. ZAMPI, ESQ. # 110168
GERALD B. DETERMAN, ESQ. # 134905
CHRISTOPHER B. DeSAULNIERS, ESQ. # 213934
Law Firm of Zampi and Associates
225 Broadway, Suite 1450
San Diego, California 92101
Telephone: (619) 231-9920 .
Facsimile: (619) 231-8529

FILED
NORTH COUNTY DIVISION
2008 JAN -4 PM 4:17
(1)
CLERK-SUPERIOR COURT
SAN DIEGO COUNTY, CA

Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Elizabeth Montiel

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA
COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO (NORTH COUNTY)

ELIZABETH MONTIEL, an individual,

) CASE NO. 37-2008-00088094-CU-OE-NC

Plaintiff,

ys.

CRESCEENT ELECTRIC SUPPLY COMPANY, a corporation; and DOES 1 through 25, inclusive,

Defendants.

) COMPLAINT FOR FAILURE TO PROVIDE
) LEAVE PURSUANT TO THE CALIFORNIA
) FAMILY RIGHTS ACT, RETALIATORY
) DISCRIMINATION AND DISCHARGE IN
) VIOLATION OF CALIFORNIA FAMILY
) RIGHTS ACT, RETALIATORY
) DISCRIMINATION AND DISCHARGE IN
) VIOLATION OF PREGNANCY DISABILITY
) LEAVE, SEX DISCRIMINATION, NEGLIGENT
) SUPERVISION AND RETENTION, TORTIOUS
) DISCHARGE IN VIOLATION OF PUBLIC
) POLICY, FAILURE TO ENGAGE IN THE
) INTERACTIVE PROCESS IN GOOD FAITH,
) FAILURE TO ACCOMMODATE CONDITIONS
) RELATED TO PREGNANCY CHILDBIRTH OR
) RELATED MEDICAL CONDITIONS,
) NEGLIGENT INFILCTION OF EMOTIONAL
) DISTRESS

Plaintiff Elizabeth Montiel (hereafter "Ms. Montiel") alleges:

INTRODUCTORY ALLEGATIONS

1. Ms. Montiel is an adult person residing at all times mentioned herein in the County of San Diego, State of California. The wrongful or illegal acts complained of herein occurred in San Diego County.

1 2. Defendant Crescent Electric Supply Company (hereafter "CESCO") is a corporation
2 conducting business at 2580 Progress Street, Vista, CA 92083, regularly employs five or more persons,
3 and is subject to suit under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (hereafter "FEHA").

4 3. Ms. Montiel is ignorant of the true names and capacities of Defendants sued herein as
5 DOES 1 through 25, inclusive, and therefore sues these Defendants by such fictitious names. Ms.
6 Montiel will amend this Complaint to allege their true names and capacities of said Defendants when
7 they are ascertained. Ms. Montiel is informed and believes and thereon alleges that each said fictitiously
8 named Defendant is responsible in some manner for the occurrences herein alleged, and that Ms.
9 Montiel's injuries and damages as herein alleged were proximately caused by their acts. Whenever
10 appearing in this complaint, each and every reference to Defendants, or to any of them, is intended to be
11 and shall be a reference to all the Defendants hereto and each of them, named and unnamed, including all
12 fictitiously-named Defendants, unless said reference is otherwise specifically qualified that the allegation
13 specifically refers only to a particular defendant. Ms. Montiel will seek leave of this Court to amend this
14 Complaint to set forth the true capacity of same Defendant when the same has been ascertained.

15 4. Ms. Montiel is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that the aforementioned
16 DOES are responsible for the acts alleged herein as the agents, employers, representatives, or employees
17 of other named Defendants, and in doing the acts alleged herein were acting within the scope of their
18 agency, employment or representative capacity of said named Defendants, or of each other..

19 5. Ms. Montiel is informed and believes and based thereon alleges that each of the
20 Defendants named herein is the agent, employer, representative or employee of the other named
21 Defendants, and in performing the acts herein alleged was acting within the course and scope of such
22 employment, agency or representative capacity and is therefore responsible for the acts described herein.

23 6. The tortious acts and omissions alleged to have occurred herein were performed by
24 Defendants or supervisors, managerial employees, or agents of Defendants, and said acts were also
25 authorized or ratified by managing agents and/or directors of, or were the policy of, Defendants.

26 7. The acts of Defendants were outrageous, and conducted with malice and with a conscious
27 disregard of Ms. Montiel's rights, so as to justify the imposition of punitive damages in an amount to be
28 shown according to proof at trial.

SPECIFIC FACTUAL ALLEGATIONS

8. At the time of the wrongful or illegal acts by Defendants, Ms. Montiel was pregnant with
9. or had just given birth to her daughter, Alyssa. Defendants knew that Ms. Montiel was pregnant or had
10. just given birth and that she was taking care of her very premature baby.

11. From on or about August 9, 2004 until on or about April 10, 2007, Defendants employed
12. Ms. Montiel as an "Administrative Assistant" and subsequently a "Lighting Project Manager," who
13. worked with clients to ensure order completion. Ms. Montiel substantially performed her job duties
14. while working for Defendants.

15. 10. On or about October 12, 2006, Ms. Montiel was put on bed rest because of her pregnancy.

16. 11. On or after November 2, 2006 Defendants mailed to Ms. Montiel a copy of a November 2,
17. 2006 memorandum from Defendants to Jeff Hoyt, Branch Manager, which stated that Ms. Montiel had
18. requested a leave of absence. The memorandum also stated that Ms. Montiel qualified for leave of up to
19. 12-weeks. Furthermore, Defendant CESCO's "policy allows you [the Branch Manager or Supervisor] to
20. extend a disability leave for a total period of 180 days." A line was checked which stated: "Elizabeth
21. Montiel disability [sic] leave can be extended, if medically necessary, up to a total of 180 days. (Can't
22. exceed 180 days)" and was signed by an unidentified person on the signature line designated "Branch
23. Manager or Supervisor."

24. 12. On or about November 15, 2006, Ms. Montiel received a letter from Defendants and
25. signed by Defendant CESCO's Payroll and Insurance Clerk, Kerry Habel, which stated that although Ms.
26. Montiel's position is normally protected for a period of 45-days, her branch manager/supervisor had
27. extended her leave to 180 days if medically necessary. Therefore, according to the letter, Defendants
28. anticipated her returning to her regular work schedule by April 9, 2007. However, the letter continued, if
she did not resume working within 180 days, "we will conclude that you have terminated your
employment." The letter further stated to "contact Steve Redfearn, Payroll & Benefits Manager, or
myself if you have any questions."

29. 13. On or about December 21, 2006, Ms. Montiel telephoned Mr. Hoyt informing him that
she would be unable to return to work on April 9, 2007 because she was due to give birth on or about

1 April 27, 2007. Mr. Hoyt told Ms. Montiel that he would call Defendant CESCO's corporate office
2 "himself" and have them provide Ms. Montiel with maternity leave once Ms. Montiel's disability leave
3 ended.

4 14. On or about February 20, 2007, Mr. Hoyt wrote a letter of recommendation for Ms.
5 Montiel which stated: "Elizabeth Montiel has been employed by Crescent Electric Supply since August
6 9, 2004. She is a project specialist in our lighting department. She is a regular employee that works a
7 minimum of 40 hours a week. She is a very competent and valued employee...."

8 15. On February 28, 2007, Ms. Montiel's daughter, Alyssa, was born 8 weeks premature. She
9 weighed 2 pounds, 2 ounces.

10 16. On or about March 4, 2007, Ms. Montiel was discharged from the hospital. Her doctor
11 told her to take 6-8 weeks to rest.

12 17. On or about March 8, 2007, Ms. Montiel's incision became infected.

13 18. On or about March 9, 2007, Ms. Montiel telephoned Mr. Brian Kopp from Human
14 Resources and asked that her daughter be put on her insurance. Ms. Montiel also spoke to Mr. Hoyt and
15 told him that Alyssa was to be kept in the hospital for four weeks. Mr. Hoyt said that he would get a
16 temporary employee to help while Ms. Montiel was out.

17 19. On or about March 27, 2007, Defendants mailed a letter to Ms. Montiel stating that since
18 she is adding her daughter to her insurance, more premiums will need to be deducted from her pay.

19 20. On or about March 31, 2007, Ms. Montiel's daughter, Alyssa, was discharged from the
20 hospital.

21 21. On or about April 6, 2007, Ms. Montiel spoke to Mr. Hoyt about Alyssa's serious health
22 conditions. Mr. Hoyt told her to take as much time off as she needed and that her job would be
23 protected.

24 22. Ms. Montiel's disability ended on or about April 30, 2007. Ms. Montiel was ready and
25 able to return to work but because Mr. Hoyt had told her to take as long as she needed, and because her
26 daughter continued to have a serious medical condition, Ms. Montiel did not return to work that day.

27 23. Without hearing anything from Defendants after her April 6, 2007 telephone conference
28 with Mr. Hoyt, in which he said to take as much time off as she needed and that her job would be

protected, Ms. Montiel learned when she went for a doctor's appointment on or about May 7, 2007, that her insurance had been cancelled.

24. On or about May 8, 2007, Defendants mailed a letter to Ms. Montiel stating she owed \$870.30 for six months of medical premiums. The letter also stated that: “[y]our position with Crescent was protected for a period of 180-days while you were absent due to a medical illness or injury. As stated in the letter sent November 15, 2006, your employment with us was protected thru 04/09/07.”¹

25. On or about May 14, 2007, Defendants mailed a letter to Ms. Montiel regarding COBRA. Because Ms. Montiel was not working, she could not afford to pay for COBRA.

26. On August 2, 2007, September 24, 2007, and October 29, 2007, and within one year of the date of the discrimination committed by Defendants, Ms. Montiel filed a charge with the California Department of Fair Employment and Housing (hereinafter "DFEH") against Defendants. DFEH issued to Ms. Montiel right-to-sue letters against Defendants on or about August 6, 2007, September 26, 2007, and October 29, 2007, which were served on Defendants on or about August 9, 2007, October 5, 2007, October 8, 2007, and November 20, 2007.

FIRST CAUSE OF ACTION
(Failure to Provide Leave Pursuant to the California Family Rights Act)
(Against All Defendants)

27. Ms. Montiel hereby incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 26 above.

28. Ms. Montiel was disabled by pregnancy starting October 12, 2006. Pursuant to California's Pregnancy Disability Leave (hereafter "PDL"), she was authorized to be on PDL for up to four months, until February 11, 2007. She then was eligible for a 12-week leave pursuant to the California Family Rights Act (hereafter "CFRA"). Defendants were aware of Ms. Montiel's pregnancy disability and eligibility for CFRA.

29. Ms. Montiel's 12-week CFRA leave should have started on February 12, 2007. Thus, the final day of her 12-week CFRA leave would have been May 6, 2007. However, Defendants terminated

¹ Ms. Montiel's actual date of termination is unclear. Documents state that it was either April 9 or 10, 2007.

1 Ms. Montiel's employment without notice effective April 9, 2007. Therefore, Defendants failed to
2 provide Ms. Montiel with her statutorily authorized 12-weeks of CFRA leave.

3 30. Defendants' actions were unlawful because California Government Code section 12945.2
4 provides that an employer shall grant an eligible employee up to 12 workweeks in any 12 month period,
5 which is separate and distinct from the PDL pursuant to Government Code section 12945. Furthermore,
6 California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 7297.6, entitled "Relationship between CFRA Leave and
7 Pregnancy Disability Leave," provides that the "maximum possible combined leave entitlement for both
8 pregnancy disability leave...and CFRA leave for reason of the birth of the child...is four months and 12
9 workweeks."

10 31. As a proximate result of Defendants' actions against Ms. Montiel, as alleged above, Ms.
11 Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered and continues to suffer damages in the form of
12 lost wages, salary, employment benefits, and additional amounts of money Ms. Montiel would have
13 received if Defendants had provided Ms. Montiel 12-weeks of CFRA leave. As a result of such denial
14 and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount according to proof.

15 32. As a further proximate result of Defendant's actions against Ms. Montiel, as alleged
16 above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered the intangible loss of such
17 employment-related opportunities as experience in the Lighting Project Manager position. As a result of
18 Defendants' actions and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount
19 according to proof.

20 33. As a further proximate result of Defendants' actions against Ms. Montiel, as alleged
21 above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered from emotional and physical
22 distress including, but not limited to, sleeplessness, worry, stress, crying, anxiety, tension, agitation,
23 panic, depression, loneliness, feelings of helplessness, frustration, fear, isolation, being overwhelmed,
24 and has been injured in mind and body. Such injuries include, but are not limited to, headaches, high
25 blood pressure, nausea, diarrhea, heart palpitations and hair loss. As a result of such harm, Ms. Montiel
26 has suffered such damages in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial.

27 34. In doing the acts herein alleged, Defendants acted with malice, fraud, or oppression, and
28 with a conscious disregard of Ms. Montiel's rights under the CFRA. Specifically, Defendants

1 intentionally failed to provide 12-weeks of CFRA leave. As such, Ms. Montiel is entitled to exemplary
2 and punitive damages from Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish Defendants and to deter such
3 wrongful conduct in the future.

4 35. Ms. Montiel is further entitled to attorney's fees and costs of suit pursuant to Government
5 Code section 12965.

6 **SECOND CAUSE OF ACTION**
7 **(Retaliatory Discrimination and Discharge in Violation of California Family Rights Act)**
8 **(Against All Defendants)**

9 36. Ms. Montiel hereby incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in
10 Paragraphs 1 through 35 above.

11 37. Ms. Montiel was eligible for and attempted to take a 12-week CFRA leave from on or
about February 12, 2007 through on or after May 6, 2007.

12 38. Defendants retaliated against Ms. Montiel by first assuring her that she would have the
13 leave, subsequently failed to provide 12-weeks of CFRA leave, and then terminated Ms. Montiel's
14 employment because she exercised her rights under the CFRA. Ms. Montiel bases this conclusion on the
15 fact that (1) she informed Defendant CESCO, through its agent Mr. Hoyt, that the time off provided by
16 Defendant CESCO, which was until April 9, 2007, was insufficient; (2) she then began her 12-week
17 CFRA leave on February 12, 2007 which should have lasted until May 6, 2007; (3) on or about March 9,
18 2007, Mr. Hoyt told Ms. Montiel that he would be hiring a temporary employee to assist him until Ms.
19 Montiel returned; (4) on or about April 6, 2007, Mr. Hoyt told Ms. Montiel that her job was protected for
20 as long as she needed; and, (5) however, Defendants unlawfully terminated Ms. Montiel's employment
21 on April 10, 2007, before she completed her CFRA leave.

22 39. Defendants' actions were unlawful because California Government Code section 12945.2
23 provides that an employer shall grant an employee up to 12 workweeks in any 12 month period, and it
24 shall be an unlawful employment practice to discriminate or discharge an individual because of the
25 individual's exercise of the right to use CFRA.

26 40. As a proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory and retaliatory actions against Ms.
27 Montiel, as alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered and continues
28 to suffer damages in the form of lost wages, salary, employment benefits, and additional amounts of

1 money Ms. Montiel would have received if Defendants had not unlawfully retaliated against or
2 terminated Ms. Montiel's employment for use of the CFRA. As a result of such retaliation and
3 consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount according to proof.

4 41. As a further proximate result of Defendants' retaliatory actions against Ms. Montiel, as
5 alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered the intangible loss of such
6 employment-related opportunities as experience in the Lighting Project Manager position. As a result of
7 such retaliation and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount according to
8 proof.

9 42. As a further proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory and retaliatory actions against
10 Ms. Montiel, as alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered from
11 emotional and physical distress including, but not limited to, sleeplessness, worry, stress, crying, anxiety,
12 tension, agitation, panic, depression, loneliness, feelings of helplessness, frustration, fear, isolation, being
13 overwhelmed, and has been injured in mind and body. Such injuries include, but are not limited to,
14 headaches, high blood pressure, nausea, diarrhea, heart palpitations and hair loss. As a result of such
15 retaliation and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount to be determined
16 according to proof at trial.

17 43. In doing the acts herein alleged, Defendants acted with malice, fraud, or oppression, and
18 with a conscious disregard of Ms. Montiel's rights under CFRA. Specifically, Defendants intentionally
19 refused to provide CFRA leave and unlawfully terminated her employment in retaliation for exercising
20 her rights under the CFRA. As such, Ms. Montiel is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages from
21 Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish Defendants and to deter such wrongful conduct in the
22 future.

23 44. Ms. Montiel is further entitled to attorney's fees and costs of suit pursuant to Government
24 Code section 12965.

25 **THIRD CAUSE OF ACTION**
26 **(Retaliatory Discrimination and Discharge in Violation of Pregnancy Disability Leave)**
27 **(Against All Defendants)**

28 45. Ms. Montiel hereby incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in
Paragraphs 1 through 44 above.

1 46. Ms. Montiel was on PDL from October 12, 2007 until February 11, 2007. Ms. Montiel
2 then attempted to take a 12-week CFRA leave from on or after February 12, 2007 through on or after
3 May 6, 2007.

4 47. Defendants retaliated against Ms. Montiel for her exercise of her rights to PDL by first
5 assuring Ms. Montiel that she would have leave following the PDL, subsequently failing to provide 12-
6 weeks of CFRA leave, and terminating Ms. Montiel's employment. Ms. Montiel bases this conclusion
7 on the fact that (1) she informed Defendant CESCO, through its agent Mr. Hoyt, that the time off
8 provided by Defendant CESCO, which was until April 9, 2007, was insufficient; (2) she began her 12-
9 week CFRA leave on February 12, 2007 which should have lasted until May 6, 2007; (3) on or about
10 March 9, 2007, Mr. Hoyt told Ms. Montiel that he would be hiring a temporary employee to assist him
11 until Ms. Montiel returned; (4) on or about April 6, 2007, Mr. Hoyt told Ms. Montiel that her job was
12 protected for as long as she needed; and, (5) however, Defendants unlawfully terminated Ms. Montiel's
13 employment on April 9, 2007, before she completed her CFRA leave, which began immediately after her
14 PDL.

15 48. Defendants' actions were unlawful because California Government Code section 12940
16 provides that it is an unlawful employment practice to discriminate against an employee because of her
17 pregnancy in compensation or in terms, conditions, or privileges of employment. (Gov. Code, §§
18 12940(a) and 12926(p).) Furthermore, California Code of Regulations, title 2, section 7291.5 provides
19 that it is unlawful for any employer, because of pregnancy of an employee, to retaliate against the
20 employee because of the exercise of her rights to take a PDL.

21 49. As a proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory and retaliatory actions against Ms.
22 Montiel, as alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered and continues
23 to suffer damages in the form of lost wages, salary, employment benefits, and additional amounts of
24 money Ms. Montiel would have received if Defendants had provided not unlawfully retaliated against or
25 terminated Ms. Montiel's employment for use of PDL. As a result of such retaliation and consequent
26 harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount according to proof.

27 50. As a further proximate result of Defendant's retaliatory actions against Ms. Montiel, as
28 alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered the intangible loss of such

employment-related opportunities as experience in the Lighting Project Manager position. As a result of such retaliation and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount according to proof.

51. As a further proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory and retaliatory actions against Ms. Montiel, as alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered from emotional and physical distress including, but not limited to, sleeplessness, worry, stress, crying, anxiety, tension, agitation, panic, depression, loneliness, feelings of helplessness, frustration, fear, isolation, being overwhelmed, and has been injured in mind and body. Such injuries include, but are not limited to, headaches, high blood pressure, nausea, diarrhea, heart palpitations and hair loss. As a result of such retaliation and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial.

52. In doing the acts herein alleged, Defendants acted with malice, fraud, or oppression, and with a conscious disregard of Ms. Montiel's rights under PDL. Specifically, Defendants intentionally refused to provide CFRA leave and unlawfully terminated her employment in retaliation for exercising her rights under the PDL. As such, Ms. Montiel is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages from Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish Defendants and to deter such wrongful conduct in the future.

53. Ms. Montiel is further entitled to attorney's fees and costs of suit pursuant to Government Code section 12965.

FOURTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Sex Discrimination)
(Against All Defendants)

54. Ms. Montiel hereby incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 53 above.

55. Ms. Montiel was on pregnancy disability leave from October 12, 2007 until February 11, 2007. Ms. Montiel attempted to take a 12-week CFRA leave from on or after February 12, 2007 through on or after May 6, 2007.

56. Defendants first assured her that she would have the requested time off, then failed to provide the time off, and was terminated from her employment, because of her pregnancy. Ms. Montiel

1 bases this conclusion on the fact that (1) she informed Defendant CESCO, through its agent Mr. Hoyt,
2 that the time off provided by Defendant CESCO, which was until April 9, 2007, was insufficient; (2) she
3 began her 12-week CFRA leave on February 12, 2007 which should have lasted until May 6, 2007; (3)
4 on or about March 9, 2007, Mr. Hoyt told Ms. Montiel that he would be hiring a temporary employee to
5 assist him until Ms. Montiel returned; (4) on or about April 6, 2007, Mr. Hoyt told Ms. Montiel that her
6 job was protected for as long as she needed; and, (5) however, Defendants unlawfully terminated Ms.
7 Montiel's employment on April 9, 2007, before she completed her CFRA leave, which began
8 immediately after her PDL.

9 **57.** Defendants' actions were unlawful because pregnancy discrimination is a form of sex
10 discrimination under article 1, section 8 of the California Constitution and FEHA. (*Badih v. Myers*
11 (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1296 and Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 7291.5.)

12 **58.** As a proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory actions against Ms. Montiel, as
13 alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered and continues to suffer
14 damages in the form of lost wages, salary, employment benefits, and additional amounts of money Ms.
15 Montiel would have received if Defendants had provided not unlawfully discriminated against her based
16 on sex. As a result of such discrimination and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages
17 in an amount according to proof.

18 **59.** As a further proximate result of Defendant's discriminatory actions against Ms. Montiel,
19 as alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered the intangible loss of
20 such employment-related opportunities as experience in the Lighting Project Manager position. As a
21 result of such discrimination and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount
22 according to proof.

23 **60.** As a further proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory actions against Ms. Montiel,
24 as alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered from emotional and
25 physical distress including, but not limited to, sleeplessness, worry, stress, crying, anxiety, tension,
26 agitation, panic, depression, loneliness, feelings of helplessness, frustration, fear, isolation, being
27 overwhelmed, and has been injured in mind and body. Such injuries include, but are not limited to,
28 headaches, high blood pressure, nausea, diarrhea, heart palpitations and hair loss. As a result of such

discrimination and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial.

61. In doing the acts herein alleged, Defendants acted with malice, fraud, or oppression, and with a conscious disregard of Ms. Montiel's rights under article 1, section 8, of the California Constitution and FEHA. (See *Badih v. Myers* (1995) 36 Cal.App.4th 1289, 1296 and Cal. Code Regs., tit. 5, § 7291.5.) Specifically, Defendants intentionally refused to provide CFRA leave and unlawfully terminated her employment because of her pregnancy. As such, Ms. Montiel is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages from Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish Defendants and to deter such wrongful conduct in the future.

62. Ms. Montiel is further entitled to attorney's fees and costs of suit pursuant to Government Code section 12965.

FIFTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligent Supervision and Retention)
(Against All Defendants)

63. Ms. Montiel hereby incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 62 above.

64. Ms. Montiel is informed and believes and thereon alleges that, in doing the acts as heretofore alleged, Defendants knew, or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have known, that Ms. Montiel's supervisor, Mr. Hoyt, was neither qualified nor able to a) advise Ms. Montiel regarding, or b) grant PDL or CFRA leave to Ms. Montiel. Defendants should have also known that an undue risk to persons such as plaintiff would exist because of Mr. Hoyt's lack of ability to a) advise regarding and b) grant leave under PDL or CFRA unless Defendants adequately trained and supervised Mr. Hoyt in the exercise of the tasks of his employment. As such, Defendants negligently supervised and retained Mr. Hoyt.

65. Notwithstanding the knowledge that Mr. Hoyt was neither qualified nor able to a) advise Ms. Montiel regarding, or b) grant PDL or CFRA leave to Ms. Montiel, Defendants did not adequately train or supervise Mr. Hoyt in his performance of advising regarding or granting PDL or CFRA leave.

66. Despite this advance knowledge, Defendants allowed Mr. Hoyt to a) advise employees regarding or b) grant PDL or CFRA leave in conscious disregard of the rights of others.

1 **67.** Defendants had a duty of care pursuant to Defendants' policies and the law to ensure that
2 Mr. Hoyt did not violate employees' rights under the PDL and CFRA. Part of Defendants' duty included
3 the supervision of employees and compliance with these laws.

4 **68.** Nevertheless, Defendants breached that duty by failing to properly supervise the
5 implementation of these laws and by allowing supervisor employees such as Mr. Hoyt to participate in
6 the violation of these laws.

7 **69.** The failure of Defendants to adequately train and supervise Mr. Hoyt was the proximate
8 cause of Ms. Montiel's injury in that Ms. Montiel relied on Mr. Hoyt's statements that her job with
9 Defendants was "safe" and that she could take as much time as she needed.

10 **70.** As a proximate result of Defendants' negligent supervision of Mr. Hoyt, as alleged above,
11 Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered and continues to suffer damages in the
12 form of lost wages, salary, employment benefits, and additional amounts of money Ms. Montiel would
13 have received if Defendants had not negligently supervised and retained Mr. Hoyt. As a result of such
14 negligent supervision and retention, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount according to
15 proof.

16 **71.** As a further proximate result of Defendants' negligent supervision and retention, as
17 alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered the intangible loss of such
18 employment-related opportunities as experience in the Lighting Project Manager position. As a result of
19 such negligent supervision and retention, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount according
20 to proof.

21 **72.** As a further proximate result of Defendants' negligent supervision and retention, as
22 alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered from emotional and
23 physical distress including, but not limited to, sleeplessness, worry, stress, crying, anxiety, tension,
24 agitation, panic, depression, loneliness, feelings of helplessness, frustration, fear, isolation, being
25 overwhelmed, and has been injured in mind and body. Such injuries include, but are not limited to,
26 headaches, high blood pressure, nausea, diarrhea, heart palpitations and hair loss. As a result of such
27 negligent supervision and retention, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount to be
28 determined according to proof at trial.

73. As a result of Defendants' conscious disregard of Ms. Montiel's rights, Ms. Montiel is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages from Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish Defendants and to deter such wrongful conduct in the future.

74. Ms. Montiel is further entitled to attorney's fees and costs of suit, in an amount the Court determines to be reasonable as authorized by the provisions of Code of Civil Procedure section 1021.5, as well as other applicable provisions.

SIXTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Tortious Discharge In Violation of Public Policy)
(Against All Defendants)

75. Ms. Montiel hereby incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 74 of her Complaint as though fully set forth herein.

76. On or about August 9, 2004, Ms. Montiel was hired by Defendant CESCO and was eventually promoted to Lighting Project Manager.

77. On or about October 12, 2006 Ms. Montiel was put on PDL by her doctor because she was pregnant. Defendants subsequently informed her that she would be required to return to work April 9, 2007. Ms. Montiel notified Defendant CESCO, through its agent Mr. Hoyt, that she needed more time, which Mr. Hoyt approved. Ms. Montiel subsequently began her CFRA leave, for which she was eligible. However, Defendants unlawfully terminated Ms. Montiel's employment because she was pregnant, and took PDL and CFRA leave.

78. Defendants' actions were unlawful because unlawful discrimination in violation of the California Constitution, the FEHA, the PDL, and CFRA are violations of public policy.

79. As a proximate result of Plaintiff's conduct as described in Paragraph 77 above, and in violation of public policy as set forth in Paragraph 78, above, Defendants terminated Ms. Montiel's employment on April 9, 2007 because of pregnancy and her exercise of her rights under PDL and CFRA.

80. As a proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory actions against Ms. Montiel, as alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered and continues to suffer damages in the form of lost wages, salary, employment benefits, and additional amounts of money Ms. Montiel would have received if Ms. Montiel's employment had not been unlawfully terminated by

1 Defendants. As a result of such discrimination and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such
2 damages in an amount according to proof.

3 81. As a further proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory actions against Ms. Montiel,
4 as alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered the intangible loss of
5 such employment-related opportunities as experience in the Lighting Project Manager position. As a
6 result of such discrimination and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount
7 according to proof.

8 82. As a further proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory actions against Ms. Montiel,
9 as alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered from emotional and
10 physical distress including, but not limited to, sleeplessness, worry, stress, crying, anxiety, tension,
11 agitation, panic, depression, loneliness, feelings of helplessness, frustration, fear, isolation, being
12 overwhelmed, and has been injured in mind and body. Such injuries include, but are not limited to,
13 headaches, high blood pressure, nausea, diarrhea, heart palpitations and hair loss. As a result of such
14 discrimination and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount to be
15 determined according to proof at trial.

16 83. In doing the acts set forth above, Defendants knew that Ms. Montiel was pregnant and had
17 exercised her rights under the CFRA and PDL. Notwithstanding this knowledge, Defendants despicably
18 subjected Ms. Montiel to cruel and unjust hardship in conscious disregard of Ms. Montiel's rights by, for
19 example, terminating Ms. Montiel's employment after almost three years of loyal service.

20 84. Defendants authorized and ratified the conduct of Ms. Habel by instructing her to send the
21 May 8, 2007 letter to Ms. Montiel pursuant to Defendants' policy. The ratification was by, among
22 others, Mr. Redfearn, Payroll & Benefits Manager of Defendant CESCO. Defendants' conduct warrants
23 the assessment of punitive damages.

24 85. Ms. Montiel is further entitled to attorney's fees and costs of suit.

SEVENTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Failure to Engage in the Interactive Process in Good Faith)
(Against All Defendants)

27 86. Ms. Montiel hereby incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in
28 Paragraphs 1 through 85 above.

1 87. From on or about December 21, 2006, Defendants intentionally failed to engage in the
2 interactive process in good faith. On or about December 21, 2006, Ms. Montiel requested a reasonable
3 accommodation of additional time off after her 180 days of disability, which ended on April 9, 2007,
4 because she was due to give birth on April 27, 2007. Mr. Hoyt told Ms. Montiel that he would call
5 Defendants himself to arrange additional leave. On or about March 9, 2007, Ms. Montiel again spoke to
6 Mr. Hoyt, and told him that Alyssa was to be kept in the hospital for four weeks. Mr. Hoyt said that he
7 would hire a temporary employee to help while Ms. Montiel was out, which would have been a
8 reasonable accommodation. On or about April 6, 2007, Ms. Montiel told Mr. Hoyt about Alyssa's
9 various serious health conditions by telephone. Mr. Hoyt told Ms. Montiel that her job will be protected
10 and to take as much time off as she needed, which would have been a reasonable accommodation.
11 However, Defendants unlawfully terminated Ms. Montiel's CFRA leave and employment on April 9,
12 2007, without notice.

13 88. At all times mentioned herein, Ms. Montiel was willing and able to perform the essential
14 job duties of her position if reasonable accommodations had been made by Defendants. At no time
15 would the performance of the essential job duties of the Lighting Project Manager position, with a
16 reasonable accommodation for Ms. Montiel's physical disabilities, have been a danger to Ms. Montiel's
17 or any other person's health or safety, nor would it have created an undue hardship to the operation of
18 Defendant CESCO's business.

19 89. Defendants intentionally failed to engage in the good faith interactive process. Ms.
20 Montiel bases this conclusion on the fact that in spite her December 21, 2006, March 9, 2007, and April
21 6, 2007, requests for reasonable accommodations of time off after April 9, 2007, and approval of same by
22 Defendant CESCO, through its agent Mr. Hoyt, Defendants unlawfully terminated Ms. Montiel's
23 employment, without notice, on April 9, 2007.

24 90. Government Code section 12940(n) prohibits an employer from failing to engage in the
25 interactive process in good faith with the employee to determine reasonable accommodations, if any, in
26 response to a request for a reasonable accommodation by an employee with known physical disabilities.
27 Government Code section 12945 forbids an employer from refusing "to provide [a] reasonable
28 accommodation for an employee for conditions related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical

1 conditions, if she so requests, with the advice of her health care provider.” Defendants’ discriminatory
2 actions against Ms. Montiel, as alleged above, constitute a violation of Government Code section
3 12940(n).

4 **91.** As a proximate result of Defendants’ discriminatory actions against Ms. Montiel, as
5 alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered and continues to suffer
6 damages in the form of lost wages, salary, employment benefits, and additional amounts of money Ms.
7 Montiel would have received if Defendants’ had engaged in the interactive process in good faith with
8 Ms. Montiel. As a result of such discrimination and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such
9 damages in an amount according to proof.

10 **92.** As a further proximate result of Defendants’ discriminatory actions against Ms. Montiel,
11 as alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered the intangible loss of
12 such employment-related opportunities as experience in the Lighting Project Manager position. As a
13 result of such discrimination and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount
14 according to proof.

15 **93.** As a further proximate result of Defendants’ discriminatory actions against Ms. Montiel,
16 as alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered from emotional and
17 physical distress including, but not limited to, sleeplessness, worry, stress, crying, anxiety, tension,
18 agitation, panic, depression, loneliness, feelings of helplessness, frustration, fear, isolation, being
19 overwhelmed, and has been injured in mind and body. Such injuries include, but are not limited to,
20 headaches, high blood pressure, nausea, diarrhea, heart palpitations and hair loss. As a result of such
21 discrimination and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount to be
22 determined according to proof at trial.

23 **94.** In doing the acts herein alleged, Defendants acted with malice, fraud, or oppression, and
24 with a conscious disregard of Ms. Montiel’s rights under FEHA. Specifically, Defendants intentionally
25 refused to engage in the interactive process in good faith in spite of being able to provide Ms. Montiel
26 reasonable accommodations. As such, Ms. Montiel is entitled to exemplary and punitive damages from
27 Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish Defendants and to deter such wrongful conduct in the
28 future.

1 95. Ms. Montiel is further entitled to attorney's fees and costs of suit pursuant to Government
2 Code section 12965.

EIGHTH CAUSE OF ACTION

(Failure to Accommodate Conditions Related to Pregnancy, Childbirth, or Related Medical Conditions)

(Against All Defendants)

6 96. Ms. Montiel hereby incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in
7 Paragraphs 1 through 95 above.

8 97. From on or about April 9, 2007, Defendants intentionally failed to reasonably
9 accommodate Ms. Montiel's conditions related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions.
10 Defendants responded to Ms. Montiel's December 21, 2007, March 9, 2007, and April 6, 2007 request
11 for unpaid leave by approving her requests and subsequently terminating her leave and employment on
12 April 9, 2007.

13 98. At all times mentioned herein, Ms. Montiel was willing and able to perform the essential
14 job duties of her position if reasonable accommodations had been made by Defendants. At no time
15 would the performance of the essential job duties of the Lighting Project Manager position, with a
16 reasonable accommodation for Ms. Montiel's conditions related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related
17 medical conditions, have been a danger to Ms. Montiel's or any other person's health or safety, nor
18 would it have created an undue hardship to the operation of Defendants' business.

19 99. Defendants intentionally failed to provide Ms. Montiel reasonable accommodations. Ms.
20 Montiel bases this conclusion on the fact that in spite of her December 21, 2006, March 9, 2007, and
21 April 6, 2007, requests for reasonable accommodations of time off after April 9, 2007, and approval of
22 same by Defendant CESCO, through its agent Mr. Hoyt, Defendants unlawfully terminated Ms.
23 Montiel's leave and employment, without notice, on April 9, 2007.

24 100. Government Code section 12945 forbids an employer from refusing “to provide [a]
25 reasonable accommodation for an employee for conditions related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related
26 medical conditions, if she so requests, with the advice of her health care provider.” Defendants’
27 discriminatory actions against Ms. Montiel, as alleged above, constitute a violation of Government Code
28 section 12945.

1 101. As a proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory actions against Ms. Montiel, as
2 alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered and continues to suffer
3 damages in the form of lost wages, salary, employment benefits, and additional amounts of money Ms.
4 Montiel would have received if Defendants had provided a reasonable accommodation for her conditions
5 which were related to pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. As a result of such
6 discrimination and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount according to
7 proof.

8 102. As a further proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory actions against Ms. Montiel,
9 as alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered the intangible loss of
10 such employment-related opportunities as experience in the Lighting Project Manager position. As a
11 result of such discrimination and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount
12 according to proof.

13 103. As a further proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory actions against Ms. Montiel,
14 as alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered from emotional and
15 physical distress including, but not limited to, sleeplessness, worry, stress, crying, anxiety, tension,
16 agitation, panic, depression, loneliness, feelings of helplessness, frustration, fear, isolation, being
17 overwhelmed, and has been injured in mind and body. Such injuries include, but are not limited to,
18 headaches, high blood pressure, nausea, diarrhea, heart palpitations and hair loss. As a result of such
19 discrimination and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount to be
20 determined according to proof at trial.

21 104. In doing the acts herein alleged, Defendants acted with malice, fraud, or oppression, and
22 with a conscious disregard of Ms. Montiel's rights under FEHA. Specifically, Defendants intentionally
23 refused to provide Ms. Montiel with a reasonable accommodation of limited extra time off in spite of
24 being able to provide Ms. Montiel reasonable accommodations for her conditions which were related to
25 pregnancy, childbirth, or related medical conditions. As such, Ms. Montiel is entitled to exemplary and
26 punitive damages from Defendants in an amount sufficient to punish Defendants and to deter such
27 wrongful conduct in the future.

28 ////

105. Ms. Montiel is further entitled to attorney's fees and costs of suit pursuant to Government Code section 12965.

NINTH CAUSE OF ACTION
(Negligent Infliction of Emotional Distress)
(Against All Defendants)

106. Ms. Montiel hereby incorporates by reference each and every allegation contained in Paragraphs 1 through 105 as though fully set forth herein.

107. Defendants had a duty, as employers, to act with due care toward Ms. Montiel by not unlawfully terminating her employment because of her pregnancy and exercise of her rights under the PDL and CFRA.

108. Defendants knew or should have known that Defendants' failure to exercise due care in the acts referred to in Paragraph 107 above would cause Ms. Montiel severe emotional distress.

109. Defendants breached their duty owed to Ms. Montiel by committing the acts alleged herein. These acts included initially approving Ms. Montiel's leave pursuant to the CFRA, and because of her pregnancy and in retaliation for her use of CFRA and PDL leave, subsequently unlawfully revoking her CFRA leave, and unlawfully terminating her employment.

110. As a proximate result of Defendants' discriminatory actions against Ms. Montiel, as alleged above, Ms. Montiel has been harmed in that Ms. Montiel has suffered from severe emotional and physical distress including, but not limited to, sleeplessness, worry, stress, crying, anxiety, tension, agitation, panic, depression, loneliness, feelings of helplessness, frustration, fear, isolation, being overwhelmed, and has been injured in mind and body. Such injuries include, but are not limited to, headaches, high blood pressure, nausea, diarrhea, heart palpitations and hair loss. As a result of such discrimination and consequent harm, Ms. Montiel has suffered such damages in an amount to be determined according to proof at trial.

MS. MONTIEL THEREFORE PRAYS FOR JUDGMENT
AGAINST DEFENDANTS AS FOLLOWS:

WHEREFORE, Ms. Montiel prays for judgment against Defendants, and each of them, as follows:

1. For compensatory and incidental damages, including, but not limited to, emotional distress, loss of wages, employee benefits, loss of future earning capacity, and other special and general damages in an amount to be shown at trial;

2. For an award of exemplary and punitive damages sufficient to punish the Defendants and deter such future conduct in an amount commensurate with Defendant's ability to pay, which will be shown at trial;

3. For an award of pre-judgment interest at the legal rate;

4. For an award of attorney's fees and costs, incurred herein pursuant to California Government Code section 12965, California Code of Civil Procedure 1021.5 and other applicable provisions;

5. For costs of suit incurred herein; and,

6. For such further relief in law or in equity, as this court deems just and proper.

DATED: January 3, 2008

Respectfully submitted,

LAW FIRM OF ZAMPI AND ASSOCIATES

By: Gerald B. Determan
GERALD B. DETERMAN

By: Christopher B. Desaulniers
CHRISTOPHER B. DESAULNIERS
Attorneys for Plaintiff,
Elizabeth Montiel

ATTORNEY OR PARTY WITHOUT ATTORNEY (Name, State Bar number, and address)

Christopher B. DeSaulniers, Esq.

Zampi and Associates

225 Broadway 1450 San Diego, CA 92108

TELEPHONE NO.: (619) 231-9920

FAX NO. (Optional): (619) 231-8529

E-MAIL ADDRESS (Optional):

ATTORNEY FOR (Name): Plaintiff

SUPERIOR COURT OF CALIFORNIA, COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO

STREET ADDRESS: 325 S. MELROSE DR.

MAILING ADDRESS:

CITY AND ZIP CODE: VISTA, CA 92083

BRANCH NAME: NORTH COUNTY DIVISION

**FILED
Clerk of the Superior Court****JAN 22 2008**

PLAINTIFF/PETITIONER: Elizabeth Montiel, an individual

CASE NUMBER:

37-2008-00088094-CU-OE-NC

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Crescent Electric Supply Company, a corporation

Ref. No. or File No.:

PROOF OF SERVICE OF SUMMONS

(Separate proof of service is required for each party served.)

1. At the time of service I was at least 18 years of age and not a party to this action.

2. I served copies of:

- a. summons
- b. complaint
- c. Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) package
- d. Civil Case Cover Sheet (served in complex cases only)
- e. cross-complaint
- f. other (specify documents): Summons; Complaint; Notice of Case Assignment; Stipulation to Use of Alternative Dispute Resolution Process; Notice to Litigants/ADR Information Package; Civil Case Cover Sheet

3. a. Party served (specify name of party as shown on documents served):

Crescent Electric Supply Company, a corporationb. Person (other than the party in item 3a) served on behalf of an entity or as an authorized agent (and not a person under item 5b on whom substituted service was made) (specify name and relationship of party named in item 3a):**Jeffrey J. Hoyt, Agent for Service**4. Address where the party was served: **2580 Progress Street****Vista, CA 92081**

5. I served the party (check proper box)

a. by personal service. I personally delivered the documents listed in item 2 to the party or person authorized to receive service of process for the party (1) on (date): (2) at (time):b. by substituted service. On (date): 01/09/2008 at (time): 04:20 pm I left the documents listed in item 2 with or in the presence of (name and title or relationship to person indicated in Item 3b):**Tracy Standen, Person In Charge**(1) (business) a person at least 18 years of age apparently in charge at the office or usual place of business of the person to be served. I informed him or her of the general nature of the papers.(2) (home) a competent member of the household (at least 18 years of age) at the dwelling house or usual place of abode of the party. I informed him or her of the general nature of the papers.(3) (physical address unknown) a person at least 18 years of age apparently in charge at the usual mailing address of the person to be served, other than a United States Postal Service post office box. I informed him or her of the general nature of the papers.(4) I thereafter mailed (by first-class, postage prepaid) copies of the documents to the person to be served at the place where the copies were left (Code Civ. Proc., §415.20). I mailed the documents on (date): 01/09/2008 from (city): San Diego or a declaration of mailing is attached.(5) I attach a declaration of diligence stating actions taken first to attempt personal service.

DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT: Crescent Electric Supply Company, a corporation

37-2008-00088094-CU-OE-NC

c. by mail and acknowledgment of receipt of service. I mailed the documents listed in item 2 to the party, to the address shown in item 4, by first-class mail, postage prepaid,

(1) on (date):

(2) from (city):

(3) with two copies of the *Notice and Acknowledgment of Receipt* and a postage-paid return envelope addressed to me. (Attach completed Notice and Acknowledgement of Receipt.) (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.30.)(4) to an address outside California with return receipt requested. (Code Civ. Proc., § 415.40.)d. by other means (specify means of service and authorizing code section): Additional page describing service is attached.

6. The "Notice to the Person Served" (on the summons) was completed as follows:

a. as an individual defendant.b. as the person sued under the fictitious name of (specify):c. as occupant.d. On behalf of (specify): **Crescent Electric Supply Company, a corporation**

under the following Code of Civil Procedure section:

- | | |
|---|---|
| <input checked="" type="checkbox"/> 416.10 (corporation) | <input type="checkbox"/> 415.95 (business organization, form unknown) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 416.20 (defunct corporation) | <input type="checkbox"/> 416.60 (minor) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 416.30 (joint stock company/association) | <input type="checkbox"/> 416.70 (ward or conservatee) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 416.40 (association or partnership) | <input type="checkbox"/> 416.90 (authorized person) |
| <input type="checkbox"/> 416.50 (public entity) | <input type="checkbox"/> 415.46 (occupant) |
| | <input type="checkbox"/> other: |

7. Person who served papers

a. Name: Javier Jorge

b. Address: 2121 Fifth Avenue, Suite 203 San Diego, CA 92103

c. Telephone number: (619) 296-0120

d. The fee for service was: \$ 84.05

e. I am:

- (1) not a registered California process server.
 (2) exempt from registration under Business and Professions Code section 22350(b).
 (3) registered California process server:
 (i) owner employee independent contractor.
 (ii) Registration No.: 959
 (iii) County: San Diego

8. I declare under penalty of perjury under the laws of the State of California that the foregoing is true and correct.

or

9. I am a California sheriff or marshal and I certify that the foregoing is true and correct.

Date: 01/16/2008



E.S.Q. Services, Inc.
 2121 Fifth Avenue, Suite 203
 San Diego, CA 92103
 (619) 296-0120

Javier Jorge
 (NAME OF PERSON WHO SERVED PAPERS/SHERIFF OR MARSHAL)